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I. INTRODUCTION 
This is a statutory interpretation case where the Industrial Commission ("Commission") 
held that an employer is responsible for the costs of a guardian and conservator for an injured 
employee because the phrase "other attendance" as used in Idaho Code§ 72-432(1) included 
such services. The Commission found that the services provided by a guardian and conservator 
could not be considered "medical" or "surgical" or "treatment". Nevertheless, the Commission 
held that "other attendance" encompasses the non-medical services performed by a guardian and 
conservator and that employers must pay for such services. For the reasons set forth herein and 
in the Appellants' Brief filed by Appellants Zing, LLC and the State Insurance Fund 
( collectively "Employer"), the Commission's decision should be reversed. 
II. ARGUMENT 
The heart of the Commission's error lies in its misinterpretation of the term "other" as 
part of the statutory phrase "other attendance". In context, "other attendance" means attendance 
that is medical or surgical in nature. The Commission's determination that Claimant Josue 
Barrios's ("Barrios") guardian and conservator provided "other attendance" that is a 
compensable worker's compensation benefit is not based on a proper interpretation of Idaho 
Code§ 72-432(1). That statute does not authorize the Commission to award benefits for non-
medically related services or care. 
While the Commission and this Court must be mindful of the maxim that the Worker's 
Compensation Act should be interpreted liberally to provide compensation for injured workers, 
the need to liberally construe worker's compensation law in favor of claimants to effect the 
1 
object of the law does not permit this Court or the Commission to act outside the authority 
granted by the Legislature. Compare Burch v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 82 Idaho 323,327,353 
P.2d 1076, 1078 (1960) ("It is too well settled under the decisions of this Court to require the 
citation of authorities that the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law of this state are 
to be liberally construed in favor of employees.") with Corgatelli v. Steel W, Inc., 157 Idaho 
287,292, 335 P.3d 1150, 1155 (2014) (As a purely statutory scheme, the Court cannot judicially 
construct a credit for employers into worker's compensation law."); see also Simpson v. 
Louisiana-Pac. Corp., 134 Idaho 209,212, 998 P.2d 1122, 1125 (2000) ("The Industrial 
Commission as '[a]n administrative agency is a creature of statute, limited to the power and 
authority granted to it by the Legislature and may not exercise its sub-legislative powers to 
modify, alter, or enlarge the legislative act which it administers.'") (citation omitted). Barrios 
requests the Court to ignore the unambiguous language of the Worker's Compensation Act, to 
ignore the clear instruction to interpret language contextually, and focus only on the oft cited 
maxim that the Worker's Compensation Act should be interpreted liberally. But, even a liberal 
interpretation does not permit the Court or Commission to find Legislative intent where none 
exists. The Commission has no authority or power to order an employer to pay for costs incurred 
by an injured employee for services provided by a guardian and conservator. 
In the proceeding below, the Commission expanded the coverage of§ 72-432(1)1, which 
this Court held "states in broad terms the medical care that an employer is required to provide to 
1 Barrios appears to argue a statutory basis for the Commission's decision beyond 
subsection 72-432(1). See generally Respondent's Brief, pp. 18-22 (discussing entirety of§ 72-
2 
an injured employee" (Reese v. V-1 Oil Co., 141 Idaho 630,633, 115 P.3d 721, 724 (2005)) to 
cover non-medical related services provided by a guardian and conservator appointed by a 
magistrate in a separate proceeding under the Idaho Probate Code. See Idaho Code§ 15-13-205 
("Except as otherwise provided in section 15-13-204, Idaho Code, a comt that has appointed a 
guardian or issued a protective order consistent with this chapter has exclusive and continuing 
jurisdiction over the proceeding until it is terminated by the court or the appointment or order 
expires by its own terms.") (emphasis added); see also Idaho Code§ 15-5-402 (court that 
appointed conservator has exclusive jurisdiction over management of the need for a conservator 
and protection of the estate). The Commission does not have jurisdiction over the payment for 
services rendered by a guardian or conservator, as the Legislature has vested exclusive 
jurisdiction over the appointment and payment of a guardian or conservator with the courts. 
Because the Commission lacked the statutory authority to award such benefits, the 
Commission's underlying decision should be reversed. 
A. The Commission Erred in Holding Other Attendance Includes Attendance that is 
Not Medical In Nature 
1. The Term Other When Used in a Statute Means "Of Like Kind and 
Character" 
The Commission erred in holding that, "[a]gainst Defendants' assertion that the type of 
attendance referenced in Idaho Code § 72-432 must be medical in nature, one need only refer to 
the language of the statute to reject this argument. The attendance that employer is required to 
432). However, Barrios does also state that, "the portion of this statute with which the parties 
have a dispute comes in subsection 1 .... " Id. at 16. 
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provide is medical, surgical and 'other', i.e., other than medical." AR, p. 31. ( emphasis added). 
The Commission ignored this Court's directive that"[ o ]ther in a statute means of like kind and 
character." Twin Falls Cty. v. Hulbert, 66 Idaho 128, 140, 156 P.2d 319,324 (1945), rev'd on 
other grounds by Hulbert v. Twin Falls Cty., 327 U.S. 103 (1946). The Commission did not 
apply this definition to "other" in§ 72-432 and erroneously held the "other attendance" an 
employer is required to pay for under§ 72-432(1) includes the services provided by a guardian 
and conservator, despite the Commission's factual finding that the services were not medical or 
surgical. AR, p. 31 ("the expenses at issue cannot fairly be characterized as medical, surgical or 
other treatment. ... "). 
This Court has repeatedly followed the doctrine of ejusdem generis when interpreting 
statutes. See Hulbert, 66 Idaho at 140, 156 P. 2d at 324 ("Though specific words and phrases are 
to be harmonized to develop a well-rounded and effective statutory structure, ejusdem generis is 
not to be disregarded."); see also Turner v. City of Lapwai, 157 Idaho 659,664,339 P.3d 544, 
549 (2014) (following ejusdem generis doctrine to interpret statutory language); Sanchez v. State, 
Dep't of Correction, 143 Idaho 239,244, 141 P.3d 1108, 1113 (2006)(same); State ex rel. 
Wasden v. Daicel Chem. Indus., Ltd., 141 Idaho 102, 109, 106 P.3d 428,435 (2005) (same); 
State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482,486, 80 P.3d 1083, 1087 (2003) (defining ejusdem generis as 
"a rule of statutory construction that finds where general words of a statute follow an 
enumeration of persons or things, such general words will be construed as meaning persons or 
things oflike or similar class or character to those specifically enumerated.") (internal quotations 
omitted). 
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In Hulbert, this Court was faced with interpreting what "any other government" meant in 
the context of the Emergency Price Control Act, which defined the term "person" as including 
the United States and "any other government". 66 Idaho at 139, 156 P.2d at 323.2 This Court 
determined, using ejusdem generis, that "other government" referred to other governments that 
were of like kind and character to the United States, a sovereign nation, and that the law did not 
apply to states and local governments. Id. Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court reversed 
the decision, holding that the Emergency Price Control Act's definition of "person" did include 
state governments and their political subdivisions. Hulbert v. Twin Falls Cty., Idaho, 327 U.S. 
103, 105 (1946). However, the United States Supreme Court did not question how the Idaho 
Supreme Court assessed the definition of"other government" through the doctrine of ejusdem 
generis. Rather, its decision rested on the Court's determination that, "Congress meant to 
include states and their political subdivisions when it expressly made the Act applicable to the 
United States 'or any other government, or any of its political subdivisions, or any agency of any 
of the foregoing .... ' Congress clearly intended to control all commodity prices and all rents with 
2 Section 302(h) of the Emergency Price Control Act defined a "person" as including "an 
individual, corporation, partnership, association, or any other organized group of persons, or 
legal successor or representative of any of the foregoing, and includes the United States or any 
agency thereof, or any other government, or any of its political subdivisions, or any agency of 
any of the foregoing." Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 98-99, 66 S. Ct. 438 (1946) (citing the 
language of the Emergency Price Control Act). 
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certain specific exceptions which it declared." Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 99, 66 S. Ct. 438, 
442 (1946).3 
Even though the decision of this Court in Hulbert was reversed, the United States 
Supreme Court's decision is not inconsistent with the doctrine of ejusdem generis. Rather, the 
United States Supreme Court essentially determined that states, for the purposes of the 
Emergency Price Control Act, were oflike kind and character as the United States - as both are 
sovereign governments (with the United States being a national sovereignty). 
This Court's holding in Hulbert that "other" in a statute means "of like kind and 
character" is consistent with how other state appellate courts and federal courts have interpreted 
the meaning of"other" in a statute. See, e.g., Trinity Park, L.P. v. City of Sunnyvale, 193 Cal. 
App. 4th 1014, 1036, 124 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26, 41-42 (2011) disapproved ofby Sterling Park, L.P. v. 
City of Palo Alto on other grounds, 57 Cal. 4th 1193, 310 P.3d 925 (2013) ("Thus, pursuant to 
ejusdem generis '[t]he words 'other' or 'any other' following an enumeration of particular 
classes should be read therefore as other such like and to include only others of like kind or 
character."'); City of Grandview v. Madison, 693 S.W.2d 118, 119 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) ("In 
accordance with that rule of construction [ ejusdem generis], ' [ t ]he words 'other' or 'any other,' 
following an enumeration of particular classes, are therefore to be read as 'other such like,' and 
to include only others of the like kind or character."') (citations omitted); Scally v. Pac. Gas & 
3 Case v. Bowles was decided the same day as Hulbert by the United States Supreme 
Court. The Hulbert decision contained no analysis and reversed the decision of the Idaho 
Supreme Court based on the Case decision. Hulbert, 327 U.S. at 105. 
6 
Elec. Co., 23 Cal. App. 3d 806, 819, 100 Cal. Rptr. 501,509 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) ("The words 
'other' or 'any other' following an enumeration of particular classes should be read therefore as 
other such like and to include only others oflike kind or character."); Keenan v. Bowers, 91 F. 
Supp. 771, 773 (E.D.S.C. 1950) ("Generally, the words 'other' and 'any other' following an 
enumeration of particular classes of things in a statute, must be read as meaning 'other such like' 
and include only words oflike kind or character."); Bigger v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 43 
Del. 274,285, 46 A.2d 137, 142 (Del. Super. Ct. 1946), affd, 43 Del. 553, 53 A.2d 761 (1947) 
("it is very generally held that the words 'other' or 'any other' following an enumeration of 
particular classes are to be read as meaning 'other such like' and include only words of like kind 
or character.); Standard Oil Co. v. Swanson, 121 Ga. 412, 49 S.E. 262,263 (1904) ("Where a 
statute or other document enumerates several classes of persons or things, and immediately 
following, and classed with such enumeration, the clause embraces 'other' persons or things, the 
word 'other' will generally be read as 'other such like,' so that persons or things therein 
comprised may be read as ejusdem generis with, and not of a quality superior to or different 
from, those specifically enumerated."). 
When the Commission attempted to determine what the Legislature intended "other 
attendance" to encompass, the Commission ignored this Court's instructions that when a general 
word or phrase (such as "other attendance") follows an enumeration of specific things (such as 
"medical" attendance or "surgical" attendance), the general words must be construed to mean 
things of a like or similar class or character to those that were specifically enumerated. The 
Commission did the opposite and held the term "other" signaled the Legislature intended "other 
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attendance" to mean attendance that is not similar to medical or surgical attendance and not of a 
like kind and character to these specifically enumerated types of attendance. See AR, p. 31. The 
Commission found that the guardian and conservator did not provide medical or surgical 
attendance but also determined the services fell within the ambit of "other attendance". The 
Commission's decision cannot stand in light of this Court's clear instruction that "other" in a 
statute means oflike kind and character. The Commission's award of benefits to Barrios for the 
costs of the services provided by a guardian and conservator should be reversed since the 
Commission based the holding on a faulty understanding of what "other" means when used in a 
statute. 
B. The Commission's Error in Interpreting "Other" as it Appears in Idaho Code § 72-
432(1) Led to an Overbroad Interpretation of Other Attendance. 
The application of ejusdem generis in Sattler v. Northwest Tissue Center, 42 P. 3d 440 
(Wash. 2002) demonstrates how the Commission should have interpreted "other attendance" in 
Idaho Code§ 72-432(1). The issue in Sattler was whether or not Northwest Tissue Center was 
entitled to immunity from suit under Washington's Uniform Anatomical Gift Act for negligently 
collecting organs from a deceased person against the wishes of the surviving husband of the 
deceased. Id. at 442. Sattler had authorized the collection of certain organs, from his deceased 
wife, but not her eyes. Id. Due to a misunderstanding, Northwest collected the corneas but not 
the globes of the eyes. Id. 
Washington's Uniform Anatomical Gift Act provided immunity to certain persons 
(specified in the statute) if the qualified individuals and entities demonstrated they acted without 
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malice and without an intent to defraud when collecting the organs. Id. The statute provided 
immunity to "[a] hospital, physician, surgeon, coroner, medical examiner, local public health 
officer, enucleator, technician, or other person .... " Id. at 442-43. Northwest was a procurement 
organization, which was not specifically enumerated in the list in the statute. Id. The 
Washington Court of Appeals used the ejusdem generis doctrine to interpret the meaning of 
"other persons" to include an organ donation procurement organization since such organizations 
provide services similar to the specifically enumerated individuals and entities. Id. at 443. The 
following excerpt demonstrates how the Commission should have applied the doctrine: 
Sattler first argues that because the statutory list of entities does 
not specifically include procurement organizations, Northwest is 
not entitled to assert the good faith defense. His interpretation of 
the statute on this point is incorrect. The statutory grant of 
immunity allows the defense to a "hospital, physician, surgeon, 
coroner, medical examiner, local public health officer, enucleator, 
technician, or other person" who acts in accordance with the Act. 
Under the rule of ejusdem generis, the general term "other 
person" cannot be read to include all other persons, but it does 
include an "other person" who is similar to the entities 
specified. See Dean v. McFarland, 81 Wash. 2d 215,221,500 
P.2d 1244 (1972). Northwest, a corporation, is a "person" under 
the Act, RCW 68.50.530(8), and is engaged in the same type of 
activity with respect to tissue and organ donation as the persons 
and entities specified in the statute. 
Id. at 443 (emphasis added). The Washington Court of Appeals held "other person" does not 
mean any other person, but only a person that is similar to a hospital, physician, etc. Id. 
The Commission erred when it held that "other attendance" meant all other attendance 
and simply looked to the dictionary definition of "to attend". Idaho Code§ 72-432(1) 
specifically refers to medical attendance or surgical attendance. The Commission's definition of 
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attendance is far too broad and covers any kind of service provided to an injured employee. The 
Commission should have limited the scope of other attendance in the statute to attendance that is 
similar to medical or surgical attendance. See Idaho Code § 72-432(1) ("the employer shall 
provide for an injured employee such reasonable medical, surgical, or other treatment or 
attendance .... "). Other attendance means attendance that is similar to medical attendance or 
surgical attendance and does not include all attendance. Employer requests this Court reverse 
the Commission's holding that "other attendance" in§ 72-432(1) includes the services provided 
by Barrios' s guardian and conservator and hold that the attendance must be of a like kind and 
character to medical or surgical attendance to be compensable under § 72-432(1 ). 
C. The Legislature is Presumed to Have Had Ejusdem Generis in Mind When it 
Adopted Idaho Code § 72-432 
The Idaho Legislature passed § 72-432 in 1971.4 The legislature in passing a statute is 
presumed to have in mind the law that exists at the time the legislature enacts the statute. Idaho 
Mut. Ben. Ass'n v. Robison, 65 Idaho 793, 799, 154 P.2d 156, 159 (1944) (citations omitted). In 
passing Idaho Code § 72-432, the Legislature knew that this Court interprets "other" in a statute 
to be "of like kind and character". See Hulbert, 66 Idaho at 139, 156 P.2d at 323. So, when the 
Legislature inserted the requirement that employers provide to injured employees "medical, 
surgical, or other treatment or attendance", the Legislature intended that "other attendance" be 
interpreted to be of like kind and character to medical attendance or surgical attendance. In other 
4 The Worker's Compensation Act existed prior to 1971. But, in 1971, the Legislature re-
codified the entire Act into Title 72 of the Idaho Code. 
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words, the Legislature intended that "other attendance" be interpreted to mean attendance that is 
medical or surgical in nature. The Commission's contrary decision should be reversed. 
D. Other Attendance is not Rendered Superfluous by Ejusdem Generis 
Limiting other attendance to attendance that is similar to medical attendance or surgical 
attendance does not render the phrase "other attendance" superfluous. Other attendance is 
attendance that is medical or surgical in nature, but not necessarily provided by a medical doctor 
or a surgeon. See Appellants' Brief, pp. 18-21 ( discussing how other courts have interpreted the 
term other attendance to cover medical care or services and focusing on nature of the services as 
opposed to the license held (or not held) by the provider). 
The Commission found that the services provided by a guardian or conservator are not 
medical, surgical, or treatment related. See AR, p. 31. That finding cannot be disturbed since it 
was supported by substantial and competent evidence.5 See, e.g., Neel v. West. Const., Inc., 147 
Idaho 146, 147,206 P. 3d 85, 86 (2009). While "other attendance" has a broader meaning than 
medical attendance (attendance provided by a licensed medical professional) or surgical 
attendance (attendance provided by a licensed surgeon), the "other attendance" must still be of a 
like kind and character to medical attendance or surgical attendance. As argued in Employer's 
prior briefing, the focus should be on the class and character of the attendance provided, not the 
licensing status of the provider. See Appellants' Brief, pp. 15-21. The Commission found the 
services provided by Barrios' s guardian and conservator were not in the same class and character 
5 The conservator and guardian both testified at the hearing that they did not provide 
Barrios any medical services or treatment. See Appellants' Brief, p. 4. 
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as medical or surgical attendance or treatment and therefore should have determined Idaho Code 
§ 72-432(1) did not authorize the Commission to order Employer to pay for such services. 
E. Using Ejusdem Generis Does not Ignore the Policy Behind the Statute 
Employer recognizes that this Court has steadfastly held that the Worker's Compensation 
Act should be liberally construed in favor of employees. See Burch at 327, 353 P.2d at 1078. 
But, a liberal interpretation of the term "other attendance" does not mean that the phrase can be 
taken out of context. See Tirocchi v. US. Rubber Co., 224 A.2d 387,442 (R.I. 1966) ("Contrary 
to petitioner's urging, a liberal construction of the statute does not warrant lifting 'or other 
attendance or treatment' out of context and attributing to it a meaning totally foreign to that 
which it has when the section is read as a whole."). 
In Burch, this Court was tasked with interpreting the meaning of "treatment" in Idaho 
Code§ 72-307, the pre-cursor to Idaho Code § 72-432. 82 Idaho at 327, 353 P.2d at 1078. The 
Court interpreted the term liberally and broadly, but still in the context of the statute, to mean 
treatment that was medical in nature. Id The Court cited approvingly to 70 C.J.S. PHYSICIANS 
AND SURGEONS§ 2. Id Notably, this Court recognized that the term treatment must be 
interpreted in context and, rather than refer to a dictionary definition of treatment, referred to a 
legal treatise that contained a definition of treatment in the context of the practice of medicine. 
Id This Court should, consistent with the holding in Burch, interpret the meaning of other 
attendance in the context of the provision of medical care. Interpreting the term attendance in 
context does not ignore the requirement that the Worker's Compensation Act be liberally 
interpreted in favor of employees. A liberal interpretation can only go so far and cannot rewrite 
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a statute or ignore the context of a word or phrase within the statute. See, e.g., Tirocchi, 224 
A.2d at 442. 
F. This Court Held§ 72-432(1) Provides a Statutory Basis for Required Medical Care 
Although this Court did not invoke ejusdem generis when tasked with interpreting the 
meaning of "treatment" in §72-432(1), the Court's decision is consistent with an application of 
that statutory interpretation tool. This Court previously held that "the first sentence of[§ 72-
432(1)] states in broad terms the medical care that an employer is required to provide to an 
injured employee." Reese, 141 Idaho at 633, 115 P.3d at 725 (emphasis added). This Court also 
affirmed its prior holding that "the word 'treatment' is a broad term and is employed to indicate 
all steps taken to "effect a cure of an injury or disease." Id. at 634, 115 P .3d at 725 ( citation 
omitted). This Court's holding on the meaning of treatment takes into account the context of the 
term within a statute that states in broad terms the medical care to be provided by employers to 
injured employees. In that context, the Court held treatment is a broad term, but still is limited in 
that the treatment is medical in nature ( or steps taken in order to effect a cure of an injury or 
disease). 
Similarly, in context and following the instruction of this Court that ejusdem generis 
should not be ignored, other attendance means attendance that is of a like kind and character as 
medical attendance or surgical attendance. Therefore, the Commission erred when it determined 
the services of a guardian or conservator (which the Commission found were not medical or 
surgical in nature) were compensable worker's compensation benefits under§ 72-432(1). The 
Commission's decision should be reversed. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
Employer requests the Court reverse the Commission's award of worker's compensation 
benefits to Barrios for the costs of services provided by his guardian and conservator. 
I /\i I;.., 
DATED this _J_U_day of March, 2017. 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
By: -· .2'1/l ?1:~-v-(1~ --fLlJ-#-~~~~~---------
Matthew C. Parks, of the firm 
Attorneys for Defendants/Employer 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
/0th I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day of March, 2017, I caused two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF to be served by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Richard S. Owen 
David M. Farney 
206 Twelfth A venue Road 
PO Box 278 
Nampa, Idaho 83653 
Attorneys for Claimant/Barrios 
14 
()c) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Email 
;1/J~~. 
Matthew C. Parks 
